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ABSTRACT 
ANTI-DRUG POLICIES: ON THE WRONG PATH TO PEACE 
By 
Hernán Maldonado Jaramillo 
 
This paper identifies the policies that may reduce the drug rents going 
from the drug business to illegal groups in Colombia. The study 
analyzes the actual situation on drug policies and shows why a drug 
prohibition is the observed political outcome on the international 
political arena. To analyze the international drug policy a gravity model 
based on Akerlof 1997 is implemented recreating an international game 
which shows that drug prohibition is a stable suboptimal policy. Finally, 
this work suggests some ways of playing the game that could offer to 
Colombia the possibility of moving towards a politically less restrictive 
environment on drug policy issues. A situation that might reduce rents 
obtained from the drug business by the illegal groups and the intensity 
of the conflict. 
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1. Introduction 
The internal conflict in Colombia represents to the country a large cost in terms of 
environmental, social, political and economical development (i.e. Depletion of natural 
resources, human rights violations, economic growth reduction, institutional deterioration, 
increase on the social inequalities, reductions on the quality and quantity of the human 
capital; and deterioration of the Colombians international reputation among others), (see 
Steiner and Corchuelo 1999 and U.N.D.P. (2003))1. 
This complexity and broadness of the conflict seems to be an endless source of studies on 
many fields. However, a literature review shows that some works take the actual policies 
as given or omit to analyze the implications of the political stance weakening the analysis 
and its conclusions2. This situation prevents the possibility of creating a critic mass of the 
political decisions made and implemented inside and outside the country. However, 
notable exceptions to that circumstance are present on many works such as, Moreno-
Sanchez, Kraybill and Thompson 2003, Naranjo 2004, Jacobson and Naranjo 2004, 
Echeverry 2004, Becker et al. 2004 and Tabares and Rosales 2005. 
The relevance of the consciousness about the policy implementation is determined by its 
potential to create a dynamic policy evaluation that allows the society to evolve by 
                                        
1 Studies have covered internal conflict on most of the mentioned subjects. This fact makes an 
attempt to summarize the literature on the topic a huge effort that could be a goal for more than 
one paper. Even though, to give a sense of the work that has been made and to contextualize 
the present work, a very simple classification that divides works by issue is presented on the 
Appendix 1. This classification acknowledges some of the most representative works on each 
area for the interested reader. 
2 As an example Diaz and Sánchez 2004 claim their research led them to “conclude that the 
expansion of illegal crop growing is a consequence of the expanding conflict. In contrast, coca 
crops can only be used to explain a small part of the armed conflict in Colombia.” This conclusion 
ignores a basic fact of drugs which is its illegal character. 
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developing a better strategy towards the termination of the Colombian internal conflict, 
or at least oriented to reduce the effects that influence the violent country situation. 
This paper attempts to contribute on the policy decision making research literature. The 
objective here is to evaluate the determinant causes of the internal and external drug 
policy implementation, centered on the Colombian interests. The hypothesis is that 
depending on the strength of the political links that Colombia creates with other countries, 
the outcome of the drug stance towards drugs will vary. 
This research shows that a strengthening the Colombian negotiation power, by creating 
new alliances on the international political arena, might lead the country to choose an 
internal drug policy stance that could reduce the negative effects of drugs business on the 
internal conflict. 
This thesis is divided on seven main parts, the first part being this introduction. The 
second part makes a brief recount of historic facts that are relevant to the internal conflict 
in Colombia. The third part presents the economic interests of the actors in the actual 
(2005) conflict in Colombia. The fourth chapter is focused on the international drug 
business. The fifth presents the theoretical model that serves as analytical framework for 
the study of the international game of drug policies. The sixth part recounts for the 
previous parts, presenting a conflict resolution strategy to the drug business problem by 
designing a national policy focused on the international political arena. The seventh part 
concludes. 
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2. A Brief Review of the Colombian Conflict3 
This section of the thesis describes the history of the Colombian conflict focusing on its 
main components in the present (2005). The first part consists of a chronological 
description of the most relevant facts. Its objective is to contextualize the historic moment 
of the conflict in a broader horizon. This set-up is an attempt to provide the reader with 
enough historical background to understand the causes and the actual interests of the 
parts in conflict. Once this is achieved, the design and analysis of a possible conflict 
resolution strategy can be better understood and described. 
2.1. 1946 – 1966: Land, Parties and Gaitán 
On this period of the Colombian history, disputes between landlords and peasants were 
common sources of tension among social classes. Peasants claimed an agrarian reform 
that never happened under any government in power (Richani 2002). 
On the political arena, La Violencia (The Violence - 1946 to 1965) was a period of 
disputes between the two main political parties (Conservatives and Liberals) for the 
control of government. In 1948, the murder of Jorge Eliecer Gaitán in Bogotá set off a 
national strike from the people against the state or, the same but in different words, 
radical liberals against conservatives; Gaitán was a democratic populist, main leader of 
the radical liberal wing at that time in politics. 
In 1953, to stop the massive murders created by The Violence, the army led by General 
Rojas Pinilla took over power. But in 1958 traditional parties looking forward to 
                                        
3 For a more detailed review see Sánchez et al. 2003. 
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recovering control came to an agreement known as the National Front. The objective of 
this agreement was to share power avoiding violent aggressions between the two party’s 
members. Two of the most relevant points of the agreement were the alternation of 
Presidents from each party and the setting apart of public positions for parties’ members. 
The National Front agreement created a barrier that cut the opportunities for other parties 
to participate in the Colombian democracy; in particular, this was relevant for future 
events regarding the communist party which was declared illegal on 1954. 
In the meanwhile, on rural areas communism was gaining power, creating communist 
communities and strengthening its links to the people that was left out from the 
governmental benefits and decisions. 
2.2. 1967-1990: Corruption, Drug Cartels and Guerrillas 
It is very likely that, after Spaniard conquer and colonization, this has been the most 
violent time in Colombian history. After the calm end of the 60’s, on the year of 1970 the 
two traditional parties made a fraudulent negative to accept General Rojas Pinilla as the 
elected President of the country. The decision of naming an undemocratic president 
created an atmosphere of exclusion and repression that evolved into the creation of 
several discomfort movements, among others the leftist urban guerrilla called M-19.  
Later on, the guerrilla movements such as the M-19 and the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia (FARC) together with the drug cartels, gave birth to a chaotic situation on 
every aspect of the national arena. 
The typical struggle between right and left during the cold war was also present in 
Colombia. The polarized situation was supported on each side by the Colombian 
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government (supported by the U.S.) and the guerrillas (supported by the U.S.S.R). The 
international tensions and their main players reinforced the Colombian internal disputes 
and provided the financial and military support to generate a deepened internal conflict. 
This situation kept all the attention of the government focused on political issues for a 
considerable period of time4. In the meantime, drug cartels were sending thousands of 
tons of drugs into the U.S. and other markets. The results of the cartels’ operations did 
not take long to show up: Extremely wealthy but violent mobs ruling one of the most, if 
not the most, profitable businesses in the world, with head quarters on a developing 
country and ruled by people that considered themselves as gods on earth. 
Drug cartels used every mean to reach their objectives; they corrupted Colombian 
institutions with money and terror, they even appealed to the elimination of any persons 
on their way by killing them. They also bombed cities to put pressure on the government 
to favor their interests with policies. They were illegal, violent, rich and powerful people. 
Naturally, the huge amount of resources coming to Colombia from developed countries 
put Colombian cartels as central targets of the drug policies on foreign drug consuming 
countries.  
The country set-up created a highly volatile environment. The interaction of the 
established legitimate and illegitimate powers caused an expected confrontation. 
Guerrillas started kidnapping family members of the drug cartels to drain resources from 
them. This situation gave to drug cartels the chance to reinforce their links to the besieged 
                                        
4  The situation was clear until 1984 when the Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla was 
assasinated. 
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Colombian population by creating the self defense armies which later on evolved into a 
right wing guerrilla.  
Rich landlords, target of the guerrilla kidnappers, supported the creation of local armies 
to combat against the drain of resources. This was reinforced by the absence of a strong 
presence of the state on rural areas and the strengthening of the guerrillas’ links into the 
population. 
This polarization and confrontations, translated to the political arena caused one of the 
most dreadful political exterminations in Colombia. The leftist party known as the 
Patriotic Union, which was the political branch of the FARC guerrilla, was systematically 
exterminated by the right wing armies as a response to the people’s support to them on 
democratic elections. As a consequence, the Colombian people lost a democratic chance 
of terminating the internal guerrilla war5. 
At the same time, other small guerrillas were focused on the extraction of resources from 
the enterprises in charge of the oil production in the country. Extortions took place and 
pipelines blows were very common. This generated international disapproval since most 
of the companies on the oil business were foreign6. 
The U.S. pressure to stop the drug cartels combined with the high magnitude of the 
attacks led by the drug cartels (i.e. Murders of Ministers and several Presidential 
candidates) and the weakness of some of the Colombian institutions (i.e. very weak and 
                                        
5 Naturally the powerful armed leftist movements also exterminate leaders of other parties; but 
might be the Patriotic Union case one of the most important in terms of the political power that 
was exercised by them. 
6 For more details on this subject see Offstein (2002) 
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corrupted Judicial branch) led to a situation where the government started a strong war 
against drug cartels which involved extradition as one of the most frightening 
punishments against drug capos. Drug cartels answered back to that policy stance by 
increasing the assassinations of political leaders who supported the extradition and the 
war against drugs and by bombing the cities. 
2.3. 1990-2005: End of big cartels and the raise of the guerrillas 
At the beginning of the 90’s the 1991 Constitution created an emotive environment 
towards a fairer more equitable society for the people. Nevertheless, some of the changes 
were less than perfect and the initial effervescence was turned into a more pessimistic 
reality.  
It is important to mention that some changes did give the opportunity of governmental 
participation to former excluded groups (aborigines, blacks, leftist and so on and so forth). 
This environment created during the first five years (1990-1994) a flexible society able to 
adapt to the needs of a multicultural society. 
This new set-up created an appropriate environment for large demobilization of most of 
the leftist guerrillas. Many were demobilized under agreements, except for the FARC, the 
ELN and the AUC. The successful demobilizations were: 
• Labor Party (Partido de los trabajadores) January 25th 1991 
• People Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación - EPL) January 15th 1991. 
• Quintín Lame May 27th 1991. 
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• Guerrilla National Coordinator (Coordinadora Nacional Guerrillera) April 9th 1994. 
This momentum changed under President Samper’s regime, when most reforms were 
either stopped or back warded under his polemic and corrupted government. During this 
government the Colombian state had a weak and disorganized army compared to 
guerrillas; the government was ineffective, corrupted and distrusted by the national and 
international communities. The Colombian society kept its inequitable character and 
experienced a lack of reforms (Maldonado 2004). Even the guerrilla said it was a weak 
government to talk with. 
Nevertheless, during the 90’s drug cartels were mostly dismantled although the drugs 
crops and structures remained. This situation caused an accommodation of drug 
structures. The new system left smaller cartels in charge of the drug commercialization 
process and illegal armed groups (ELN – National Army for freedom, FARC – 
Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces and AUC – Colombian United Self Defense) in 
charge of the drug production. 
Drug cartels were part of the drug business as profit oriented structures. But under the 
new arrangement, guerrillas and self defense groups with objectives that not let them be 
clearly defined as exclusively profits oriented structures took control of the large profits 
generated by the drug business. As a result, the money coming from the drugs reinforced 
the structures of the guerrillas’ and self defense armies, giving them more power to buy 
weapons and to extend their influence on more regions. 
In 1998 Colombia ended the nightmare of Samper as President and started a slow 
recovery under President Pastrana. The economic growth as one of the most important 
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motors of social stability stopped its poor performance after 1999 (Maldonado 2004). 
On January the 7th of 1999 President Pastrana, working in cooperation with the FARC 
guerrilla, initiated a peace process. All members of the FARC group were allowed to stay 
on a demilitarized zone conformed by 42.000 km2 on southern Colombia.  
The peace process was an initial step towards negotiation but at the end both parts 
blamed each other for not showing a real willingness for cooperation. Experiencing a 
slow economic recovery and still under an uncertain political situation, Colombia ended 
the XX century. 
As a response to the little cooperation signs on the peace process, reinforced by the 
suspicion of an internal reform plan of the FARC guerrilla, the government decided to 
reinforce the army.  
That was a strategic plan of the government to face an eventual military confrontation 
against the FARC guerrilla, contingent to a failure on the result of the peace process. The 
strategic reinforcement was called Plan Colombia, which attempted to attack all the 
Illegal armed groups’ structures by weakening their financial sources (especially drug 
related) and by implementing a stronger military structure to fight them. 
Up to today, donations from the U.S. to Plan Colombia have been successful on some of 
their objectives but not in others. The Government has recovered presence on many 
Colombian regions, but reduction on drug crops has not been as effective as expected. 
Plan Colombia has always been questioned but it has been effective in stopping guerrilla 
attacks and their negative impact on the economy. This was achieved by putting more 
pressure over the drug business and reconstructing a weakened army. The Plan Colombia 
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agreement has been used by both President Pastrana and President Uribe Vélez7. 
The consolidation of the project has been achieved under the super effective Colombian 
armed forces led by President Uribe Vélez, with a terrific combination of a strengthened 
army by the Plan Colombia resources and leadership of the pro military President Alvaro 
Uribe Vélez. To all lights the army has gained a better position on the internal armed 
conflict.  
In the 90’s and early 00’s, the AUC right wing self defense army has gained more power. 
Nevertheless, on the year 2004 President Alvaro Uribe Vélez started a negotiation 
process with them to reincorporate its leaders and troops to the civil society. The leaders 
have explicitly mentioned their intentions to be part of the democratic process as a new 
force on the Colombian political arena. 
The historic review of the conflict presented here accounts for some of the most 
important historic trends that led to the actual situation of the Colombian conflict. 
Nevertheless, the description just pretends to act as a context to analyze the drug business 
and the policies related to that phenomenon. 
3. Economic interests in the conflict 
The illegal actors on the Colombian conflict use typically three main sources of rents to 
finance their activities: 
1. Rent Creation: Mainly defined by production and traffic of cocaine, heroin or other 
drugs to obtain rents. 
                                        
7 For more information on Plan Colombia visit US Department of State: www.state.gov; to see 
the aid expressed in terms of money go to Appendix 2. 
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2. Private Rent Extraction: Kidnappings and extortions of persons or enterprises to 
extract their private wealth. 
3. Public Rent Extraction: Kidnappings and extortions of persons or state entities to 
extract rents from a public fund. 
Every one of these subjects has been analyzed on the economic literature. Nevertheless 
those topics involve many different aspects creating a vast amount of sub fields of 
research. Some of the most important studies on the roles of rents in the Colombian 
conflict are described below. 
3.1. Rent Creation 
Díaz and Sánchez (2004) among others have found evidence of the strong linkage 
between operations of illegal armed groups and drug crops. Also other information 
sources8 have shown that rents from drugs are one of the main funds for the illegal armed 
groups to keep the structures working properly and to finance the war expenditures (i.e. 
troop’s wages, ammunition, weapons, etc). For this reason there are policies oriented to 
stop the mentioned link. Those policies are supported mainly by the Colombian 
government and by the U.S. government, because both have interests to cut off the drug 
business and its associated rents. 
The literature shows interesting features of drug policies oriented to reduce the size of the 
drug market. On one hand, Naranjo (2004) concludes that reinforcement of reduction on 
the demand side of the drug market has a larger impact on drug consumption than efforts 
                                        
8 “Las cuentas de las FARC”, Semana magazine ed. 1187, January 2005. 
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on the supply side. This work is nicely complemented by Tabares and Rosales (2005) 
who conclude that alternative developments to coca crops have larger effects on drug 
crops reduction than crops eradication. 
By a combined analysis of Naranjo and Tabares and Rosales, it can be concluded that: 
creation of an alternative source of rents to drug farmers’ cause an effective reduction of 
drug production which affects the supply side of the drug market. But moreover, the 
policy objective should not be just focused on drug production but on drug consumption 
too. 
The logic behind the argument is: a reduction on the drug cultivated area could possibly 
move out the drug business from Colombia. This, added to a reduction on the 
effectiveness of drug distribution in the U.S. market, might increase the cost of the drug 
trafficking business. 
These conclusions leave one last question remaining; by implementing the mentioned 
policies, is it possible to terminate the drug business in the U.S.? In other words, is it 
possible to terminate the drug crops in the world and drug consumption in the U.S. by 
any of the mentioned policies? The evidence shows that cocaine crops may have been 
reducing in Colombia but the price and expenditures have been declining and the 
consumption has been recently increasing in the U.S. market; even under an expansion of 
counter drug expenditures on the production side such as Plan Colombia (See Appendix 
2 and Appendix 3). All these are symptoms of an ineffective policy, which leads to 
conclude that drug policy should be reviewed by both countries. 
In particular for the Colombian interests could be relevant to identify if prohibition and 
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repression of the drug business is an optimal policy to reduce the rents that are transferred 
from drug business to illegal groups9 10. Moreover, Colombian policy designers and 
makers should be able to identify the optimal policies that could lead Colombia to reduce 
the size of the drug rents that feed the internal war. The answer to that question could 
give a clue about the possibility of reducing one of the three main financial sources of the 
war in Colombia. 
3.2. Private Rent Extraction 
Other source of rents in the Colombian conflict is extortion to private individuals or 
companies. 
Offstein (2002) shows that guerrilla attacks are related to oil company extortions. He 
found that guerrilla groups expect to receive compensation from the oil companies for not 
blowing their oil-pipelines. Rubio (2003) presents a historical recount of the kidnappings 
in Colombia by showing the links between illegal groups and this form of private rent 
extraction. Another example of private rent extraction is Pshisva and Suárez (2004); they 
analyze the impact of crime on firm investment. The central finding on the paper is that 
firms invest less when kidnappings target them. 
                                        
9 Echeverry (2004) found that war on drugs, as it is defined now, could make sense just in the 
long run. 
10 The termination of the drug consumption in the world is not as relevant to Colombia as the 
termination of the link that connects drug business and internal conflict in Colombia. The reason 
behind that fact is that drugs consumption in Colombia is far from being as important as in other 
countries. While the incoming money from dugs to the internal conflict acts as the energy that 
keeps it as a main problem to the country. 
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3.3. Public Rent extraction 
Finally and closely linked to the last subsection, is the public rent extraction. This kind of 
rent extraction is associated to extortions or kidnappings made by illegal armed groups 
against public servants to obtain public funds. 
The main study on public rent extraction is Rubio 2002. This study found that the most 
relevant public rents associated to the presence of illegal groups are oil rents transfers to 
municipalities11 and rents from gambling.  
Bottía 2003 found that there is no evidence to affirm that state absence is a cause of 
increment on the presence of illegal groups. This might be a blurry clue of a tie between 
illegal armed groups’ presence and rent extraction of the state funds on the municipal 
level. Even though, this hypothetical relationship should be the objective of more studies 
to find more concluding evidence on the issue. 
On the next section this work will focus on the first phenomenon mentioned: rent creation. 
The analysis will center on the role played by drug rents on the Colombian internal 
conflict. A descriptive approach of the main links of drugs rents to the conflict and the 
international cycle of drugs rents will be addressed to provide an outlook of this 
economic phenomenon. 
                                        
11 These transfers are given to the Colombian municipalities that have oil on their ground as a 
compensation for the extraction. 
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4. Drug Business and Colombian Conflict 
Colombian conflict is particularly lucrative to the parts that have links to the drug 
business. It plays a key role in making available a very large amount of rents for its 
participants. On that sense drugs business’ rents in Colombia are used mainly on three 
issues:  
1) To finance large scale armed forces under a flag of an ideology (guerrillas or 
paramilitary groups) or; 
2) to create or maintain working strong armed mobs (Cartels) that can keep the 
government apart from their illegal business (by the use of violence acts) and 
therefore from their source of profits or;  
3) a combination of the first two cases. 
This section will present how the economics of drug business work in Colombia and also 
will explain the main interests of the parties in the process. 
4.1. Recapitulation and definitions 
Recalling the historical review, Colombian drug business has changed its leading group 
many times. Leaders started as small drug traffickers on the 70’s that evolved into Cartels 
on 80’s, and after an strengthening on Government opposition to drug business they 
mutated into a cooperative hybrid conformed by drug cartels and illegal armed groups on 
the early 90’s. Even though, the level of influence by illegal armed groups over drug 
business has varied between leftist guerrilla and paramilitary groups; the big picture of 
drug business reached a stable situation on 90’s since when small drug cartels and both 
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kinds of illegal armed groups have worked closely on the drug production and traffic. 
This background serves to be aware of the relevant influence of drug business in the 
Colombian conflict. However, to understand the drug business from an economic 
perspective some relevant concepts must be explored. 
4.1.1. What is the Drug Business Market? 
It is an illegal market conformed by a supply side (producers) and a demand side (buyers). 
Naturally there are many different levels of relations between buyers and sellers around 
drugs. It starts at the farming stage going thru a market chain until it reaches the final 
costumer.  
4.1.2. What is the Attractiveness of the Drug Business?12 
The drug business, as many other illegal businesses, is highly profitable. Typically there 
are not many players at some stages of the market. This situation creates space for rents 
from a non-competitive structure13. Additionally, the possibility of being caught by the 
state and subsequently being punished by it is incorporated as a risk prime (see also 
Steiner and Corchuelo 2000). Finally, the demand side of the market is very inelastic, 
which allows supply side players to transfer any cost variation as an additional price to 
consumers.  
                                        
12 For more detail on this subject see Corchuelo and Steiner 2000.  
13 The market power structure on the drug business was clear on the 80’s and early 90’s in 
Colombia when the drug cartels used to be at most three and they where the lords of the whole 
market. 
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It is also important to mention the large size of the market in the case of drugs. Although, 
revenues from drug traffic have been showing a declining participation in the Colombian 
G.D.P. on the last twenty years, the size of the market is still large. Rocha (1999) 
estimates net revenue from drug trafficking to average U.S.$2,229 million annually 
between 1982 and 199814. Steiner (1997) estimated revenue in the range of U.S.$1,500 - 
$2,500 million annually between 1980 and 199515. 
Steiner and Corchuelo (2000) point out that those revenues have fallen from around 6% 
in 1990 to 2.3% in 1998. This can be explained by the drug cartels disarticulation that 
took place in Colombia on the 90’s, that process might have created a more competitive 
structure on the Colombian drug business, moving part of the revenues that were going to 
Colombian traffickers to traffic Cartels in countries like Mexico. 
The general aspects presented above are useful to understand some of the main details 
and motivations behind the drug business and the cruelty of the internal conflict in 
Colombia. The next step to create a picture of the role of drugs in the Colombian conflict 
is to articulate the drug business to the Colombian conflict. 
4.2. Colombian Conflict from the Drug Business Perspective 
The drug business conflict in Colombia is represented by the Figure 1 and can be 
explained as follows:  
                                        
14 Quoted by Steiner and Corchuelo (2000). 
15 Quoted by Steiner and Corchuelo (2000). 
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• Drug consumers in high income countries demand drugs (mainly the United States of 
America and European countries; in general, all high income countries), 
• Governments of high income countries where drug consumers live prohibit drug 
production and consumption within their borders. This implies they spend money to 
control the drug market.  
• As a policy to decrease consumption on high income countries; governments try to 
cut drug supplies coming from low income countries, by supporting governments of 
those countries on drug business eradication. 
• Drug demand is satisfied by drug producing structures on low income countries (in 
this case Colombia).  
• The inputs for drug production are bought on the national and international market. 
• Colombia prohibits drugs production and consumption then: 
 Drug producers are more likely to be people living in the illegality because 
they have lower marginal costs of doing more illegal activities. For example, 
illegal armed groups have constituted drugs production structure to finance 
their objectives in Colombia.  
 Also since drugs are illegal in Colombia and foreign countries pay for its 
control, Colombian security forces such as the police or the army pursue drug 
producers like illegal armed groups. 
• The drugs business represents a large amount of profits for suppliers and with that 
money state corruption and armed opposition to the state are made to retain the profits 
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obtained from the drug traffic and in some cases to keep other illegal structures 
working (i.e. insurgency or self defense armies for the Colombian case). 
• To keep illegal structures working and also to keep running the drug business, war 
supplies are bought on the international market. Also people are hired to be part of the 
illegal armies or structures to combat the state in Colombia and to reach those groups 
objectives. 
• To combat the illegal structures the Colombian state buy war supplies on the 
international market or receive those as transfers from the Governments in drug 
consuming countries. As part of the strategy Colombian people are hired to be part of 
the national army or state structures to combat the drug business in Colombia. 
• The result of the drug business cycle money in Colombia is a reinforcement of the 
Colombian internal conflict. Without the presence of that money the Colombian 
conflict would have been finance by the other sources of rents presented on the 
chapter 3 on the illegal side and by the taxes that are already spent on the war against 
illegal armed groups. 
The big picture of the market and its consequences for Colombia are: Colombia has a 
conflict supported on the government side by resources 16  coming from foreign 
governments on high income countries. The objective of that money is to reduce drug 
supply by reducing the drug production and traffic. On the other side the conflict is also 
financed by money coming from drug consumers on high income countries to satisfy 
                                        
16 Resources are offered in many different kinds: money, military training, social support, trade 
benefits and last but not the least weapons and military tools. 
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their drugs demand. That money serves to maintain a supply of drug crops, reinforcing 
the power of drug producers to reach their objectives and their drug producing structures. 
At the end a large amount of the money used on the war against drugs goes back to 
developed countries to buy war supplies and the rest stays in Colombia to finance armies 
on both sides. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Colombian Conflict from the Drug Business Perspective 
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4.3. Alternatives to stop the drug business cycle and its impact 
To stop the illegal drug business cycle there are four options: 
1) Reduction of drug demand on high income countries 
2) Reduction of drug supply on low income countries 
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4) Drug business legalization 
Scientific literature and politic decisions still keep a debate on what is the best way to 
achieve those policy objectives. The discussion turns around using repression over an 
illegal drug market versus legalizing and regulating it. Interestingly, opposing answers 
come from different arenas: the political answer to the question has been repression but 
the scientific answer is legalization. 
The puzzle has been cleverly resolved on a paper from Becker et al. (2004) where the 
authors illustrate why policy makers believe more on some particular kinds of repression 
than on a legalization process. 
The argument on the paper basically states that drugs legalization is difficult on the 
political arena. Drugs legalization represents an increase on drugs consumption on middle 
and high income people, which is not in their interest as high income persons with power 
to be policy decision makers. The authors go further and explain that on the case of 
penalties to drugs business policy makers are more flexible and soft with consumers than 
traffickers and producers. The article argues that the consumers group is composed by 
both rich and poor people but producers and traffickers are mainly poor people. Since 
rich people are more influent on policy design they tend to be more benevolent when 
determining the policies that punish their practices (Becker et. al. 2004). 
Nevertheless, it is not clear why a legalization policy is not implemented in countries like 
Colombia, where high income people also incur in high costs by the strengthening of the 
illegal armed groups; costs such as increase of kidnappings, extortion, and the direct and 
indirect effects of the different kinds of rent extraction. The question is even more 
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relevant if it is acknowledge that drug business causes more costs to Colombia than the 
rents that are driven to the country (Steiner and Corchuelo 2000). 
The last questioning leads to the main question of this thesis which is: why does not 
Colombia legalize the drug business to reduce the magnitude of the internal conflict? On 
this thesis it will be argued that the answer to that question can be found by analyzing and 
understanding the international political stance towards drugs that Colombia has been 
assuming. 
The next chapter provides a game theoretic approach to solve the mentioned question. 
After the mentioned analysis this paper will analyze the actual international stance 
assumed by Colombia and will present some plausible paths to reduce the importance of 
the drugs market in the Colombian conflict. 
5. Drug policy an International Game: Background and Insight 
On a general framework Akerlof (1997) notes that social interaction theory explains why 
social decisions are not simple choices based primarily on individual considerations. 
Particular examples of this reasoning are several of Becker’s and Akerlof’s (1997) 
articles. Those studies have shown how every day life involves decisions with power to 
influence other people’s decisions17. Analogously it is possible to understand countries as 
individual units that make decisions on national politics with repercussions on the 
national politics of foreign countries (i.e. International politics). 
                                        
17 Becker 1971, 1973, 1974, 1977. 
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This is particularly true in the case of countries that work closely on some interests, 
cooperating when establishing policy guidelines. The political relation between Colombia 
and U.S. on the specific case of drug policy has a twenty years tradition of cooperation 
and policy alignment against drug production, traffic and consumption. This tie has been 
reinforced more than ever on the last years, when terrorism acts and drug business have 
been understood as closely related. As it was presented above, the “Plan Colombia” is 
today the explicit manifestation of cooperation between the two countries. This aid 
package implies a policy alignment from Colombia to U.S.’ decisions in order to receive 
help on the “war against drugs and terror”, as it has been manifested to be on the U.S. 
politicians’ interests. 
This section, parallel to the model in Akerlof (1997) on social decisions; analyze the 
effects of political decisions made by basic agents named politicians deciding on several 
different countries. 
The model is considered appropriate for this analysis since political links between 
countries creates economic relations between politicians. They end up determining the 
political stance assumed on its own country and therefore affecting decisions on foreign 
countries too.  
In this particular case drug prohibition by the United States creates a threat of retaliation 
for drug producing countries such as Colombia if they do not aligned their national 
policies with U.S. policy (i.e. either by facing aid reduction programs, strict economic 
controls on trade, reduction of trade benefits, immigration barriers, investment reduction, 
etc…). Hence a legalization policy could affect the political career of candidates on their 
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countries by the means of a retaliation policy implemented by the U.S. 
From the U.S. politicians perspective a misalignment on drug policies from a foreign 
country that has received funds for drug eradication programs could be perceived by 
voters as a waste of resources and a political failure on the policy implementation process. 
Moreover, a step towards drug legalization has been shown by Becker et al. 2004 not to 
be on the U.S. policy makers’ interests. 
By this argument is pretended to point out why politicians on both countries are 
interested in doing their best effort to reach the policy objectives of a particular stance (i.e. 
drug prohibition) when implemented. 
5.1. Drug Policy an International Game: The Story Behind the Model 
Among others, Becker et al. 2004 show that drug legalization is an optimal policy 
according to the theory and evidence used on their article. Nevertheless, this policy is 
rarely implemented; all the more, perhaps the furthest policy stances to legalization are 
assumed on the countries that have the largest stakes on the drug market (for instance, 
U.S. as demand side and Colombia as supplier). On this paper, it will be shown how 
when countries set the suboptimal policy of drug prohibition it could constitute a stable 
suboptimal equilibrium on the international policy arena. 
The first part of the model presents the choice that a single country would make on the 
drug legalization issue when such decision has to be taken without being influenced by 
any other country. That choice is the optimal policy for the country, which in this case is 
assumed to be legalization. 
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The next step incorporates to the model a foreign country which affects the drug policy 
definition of the initial country. The model will show how under certain conditions, once 
politicians set an initial suboptimal policy stance, then the result of the game will be also 
a suboptimal choice of drug policy stance for both countries. The initial position set by 
politicians is on of the determinants of the suboptimal policy result, which is also a drug 
prohibition policy. 
The model also gives a central role to the economic benefits received by each side during 
the political process of policy definition. Those are present in the case of Colombia, on 
the huge amount of resources transferred to the country from the U.S. on the war against 
drugs and terror. In the case of the U.S. there are also established benefits for U.S. 
politicians by implementing such a policy. The situation makes Colombian politicians 
more likely to align their country policies with the U.S. rather than with other countries 
that are more politically distant (i.e. Netherlands) in terms of cooperation18. This happens 
because a change on the political stance becomes costly for Colombian politicians, as it 
will be proved. On the other hand, a change on the political stance from the U.S. 
regarding drugs could cause an increase on the amount of drugs received by that country. 
This is interpreted as a cost in terms of the interests of the policy makers affecting the 
political exchange. A move towards drug legalization has been shown by Becker et al. 
2004 not to be on the U.S. policy makers’ interests. 
                                        
18 Eventually the links to U.S. constitute an obstacle to create cooperative policies with countries 
under similar circumstances. 
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5.2. Drug Policy an International Game: Theoretical Settings19 
The model presented in this article is based on the broadly used gravity model originally 
designed by Feynman (1963)20 and implemented in economics by Krugman as quoted on 
Akerlof (1997), whom also uses the gravity model and whom designed the version 
adapted here. 
The utility function on the model is the indirect utility function of the policy makers on 
each country on the game. The payoffs are determined by an intrinsic value of the 
decision and a value that is affected by the decisions made by politicians on a different 
country. 
The objective of the politicians is to maximize their utility function by incorporating 
decisions made by politicians in other countries. It is assumed that the utility of the 
politicians represent an economic value for them. 
Following the set-up presented by Akerlof (1997), it is assumed that there are two players, 
one on each country; U.S. and Colombia. Each player sets its policy maximizing its 
utility, knowing what foreign country policy makers did on their last policy definition 
regarding drugs, and being aware of their preferences on the subject. Both politicians 
must form expectations about the policy stance on the other country and, taking into 
account that policies towards drugs in U.S. and Colombia have been stable for a long 
                                        
19 This section uses most of the explanations given by Akerlof (1997) since his model is the one 
adopted here. 
20 Quoted in Akerlof (1997). 
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time, both will assume that on the future the other country policy stance will remain the 
same21. 
Based on the outline on games presented by Mas-Colell et. al. (1995) it is possible to 
define the game by a set of two players, PL = {COL, US}, where Col represents 
Colombian politicians and policy makers, and US United States of America politicians 
and policy makers. The information for both players is the same: each knows the last 
move of the other player, represented by a policy stance, but they can not observe the 
actual decision of the other player. Both players decide the policy stance regarding drugs 
at the same time. All players have preferences defined by the indirect utility function 
represented by the expression: 
( )( )[ ] ( )cbxaxdgdfeU iiij eijiji ++−+++= ∑≠ 121,1,0    (0) 
In (0) the d functions represent the political distance between two countries on a 
particular time (i.e. 0 or 1). The sub indexes i and j represent each county where 
politicians making decisions were designated. The super index e is attached to a distance 
function which indicates that its correspondent value is an expectation formed by 
politicians on country i at the time zero over the behavior of politicians of country j at the 
time 1. The variables f and g represent the political mass of each country on the economic 
exchange (e) determined by the policy decisions. Finally the concave function at the end 
                                        
21 In this model it is assumed that politicians on each country want to set the optimal policy for 
their countries. Even if politicians face a conflict of interests, here it is assumed they always 
prefer the best for their country people. This assumption helps to show that even if politicians 
were benevolent decisions makers, their decisions under certain conditions, could lead to 
implement a suboptimal equilibrium policy. 
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of the expression represents the intrinsic value for a politician of the country i of a 
particular policy implementation. 
The utility function represented by (0) can be more explicitly denoted by: 
( )( )[ ] ( )cbxaxxxgxxfeU iiij ejijii ++−+−+−+= ∑≠ 1211100    (1) 
As in Akerlof 1997 the problem confronting each player i is to choose x1i depending on 
its initial position x0i and the expected initial position x1j of the other player. In order to 
make this decision the player must form expectations about the actual position of her 
potential “trading partner” in drug policy definition. Many outcomes are possible 
depending upon how these expectations are formed. The simplest assumption is static 
expectations that the acquired drug policy stance of all other players will coincide with 
their initial position; this means that xe1j =x0j 22.  
It is also important to note that in (1) the variable xij plays the role as a political stance but 
it also represents an economic value for the politicians. The policy stance determines an 
intrinsic voters attitude or political party attitude that represent an intrinsic economic 
value for the politicians, in this case represented by: ( )cbxax ii ++− 121 . 
5.2.1. The Economic Decision: One Party 
This part shows how a country will choose the economic optimum decision towards a 
particular issue if its policy choice is not affected by decisions made in any other country. 
                                        
22 As noted before, the assumption does not seem to be too strong since U.S. and Colombia drug 
policies have been aligned for a long time. 
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For this case it is assumed there is only one country (player) in the game. The politicians 
in that country have a utility represented by the indirect utility function shown in (1) but 
adapted to the case of one player. The utility function implemented for the case looks 
slightly different to (1), but after a careful glimpse it becomes clear that the terms 
removed just make sense in the two countries case. Therefore, the objective utility 
function can be represented as: 
cbxaxU ColCol ++−= 1211     (1a) 
The optimization problem is:  
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The maximum is represented by x1Col = b/2a which, as mentioned, is assumed to be drug 
legalization and is the optimal economic decision made by politicians under the described 
circumstances. 
5.2.2. The Economic Decision: Two Parties 
This game is defined as a two country; for each country the following segment will show 
how optimizing politicians will choose to locate their policy stance at the initial position 
of a foreign country. The requirements for that outcome are that both countries have 
implemented similar policies regarding drugs and that they have a strong linkage on both 
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the political and economic arena.  
At the end of the game Colombia locates its policy stance at the initial position of the U.S. 
(United States of America) (x0us) and the U.S. chooses to locate its policy stance at the 
initial position of country Col (x0Col). This happens even under the possibility of choosing 
a different position from the economic optimum value. 
The mathematical maximization of the indirect utility function represented by (1) 
requires the preservation of the absolute values. For this reason the function is defined by 
parts, changing the sign of the quantity (x1Col-x0us) from positive to negative as needed. 
Consequently the function can be defined for the interval x1Col <x0us as: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] cbxaxxxgxxfeU ColColUSColColUS ++−⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ −−⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ −+= 12101001 1  (3) 
Note that quantity (x1Col–x0us) is negative in this range since x1Col <x0us. The derivative of 
(3) for the range x1Col <x0us is 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )baxxxgxxfex
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01001
1 21   (3a) 
Note that the first term is a constant, in this case for simplicity on the argument it is 
assumed that x0Col <x0us, which makes the whole first term positive. The part 
( )[ ]USCol xxg 01 −−  on the second term never changes its sign because on this range it is 
always true that x1Col <x0us, which guarantees that the key-bracketed term is not only 
positive, but that it never shows a peak. The last term is assumed to be positive 
( 02 1 >+− bax Col ) because it represents an intrinsic value for the politicians. 
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In consequence, USCol xx 01 ≥  must be true because otherwise the optimum could not be 
reached since (1) is a concave function. 
For the interval x0us<x1Col<b/2a, the function U1 is: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] cbxaxxxgxxfeU ColColUSColColUS ++−⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ −+⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ −+= 12101001 1   (4) 
The derivative for the mentioned range is: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ] ( )baxxxgxxfex
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Reader may recall that derivatives are not well defined when the original function 
changes its direction abruptly creating a discontinuity on the derivative function. This 
kind of discontinuity can be observed on the function U1 when x1Col = x0us, where right 
hand derivative and left hand derivative have different magnitude. This fact alone does 
not guarantee immediately that this point is the optimum value of x1Col for country Col, 
but the optimality could be guaranteed if some conditions are fulfilled. It is required that: 
Distance between b/2a and x1Col is sufficiently large and the intrinsic value of x is small 
relative to the exchange value (e). 
Finally, in the range x1Col>b/2a, the value of U1 is the same as (4) and the derivative 
remains the same as (4a). In this case under the mentioned conditions the derivative does 
not change its sign. This concludes the proof and shows how under certain conditions it is 
possible to find that x1Col will be chosen on the initial value of x0us because U1 reaches its 
maximum value at that point. A similar proof can be made to show that the same 
outcome holds true for X1US. 
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5.3. Drug Policy an International Game: Policy Implications 
This game has shown how a suboptimal drug policy leads under some circumstances to a 
suboptimal equilibrium on drug policy decisions. One of the most important parameters 
in the model is the exchange value (e); if that value is large enough the equilibrium policy 
would remain suboptimal. 
In the case of exchange value Plan Colombia could be mentioned as an example as it 
represents a large amount of transfers from the U.S. Government to the Colombian 
government. This policy generates a very strong linkage between Colombian policy and 
U.S. policy decisions. It is also important to mention that for the U.S. politicians the 
amount of resources transferred to Colombia represent a commitment to the initial policy 
stances towards drugs (prohibition) represented by (X0us). The amount of resources 
transferred by the U.S. to Colombia and the amount of resources spent internally23 in the 
U.S. to control drug business increases the value of the political exchange (e) and 
consequently the potential cost of a policy misalignment. That argument can be 
understood as the utility reduction for the politicians in the U.S. that could be created if a 
deviation on the policy stance is adopted by the Colombian government. A policy choice 
of that kind represents a utility reduction by an increase on the political stance distance of 
the two countries. 
                                        
23  A summary of the resources spent by the US society by drug abuse are presented on 
Appendix 3: Drug Price, Users and Expenditure on Table 7 and Table 8. 
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Therefore the model shows the relevance of the political exchange programs between U.S. 
and Colombia, which creates a strong link and constitutes an obstacle to reach the 
optimal policy objective for both countries. 
An implication from the analysis is that Colombia could open its access to a broader 
spectrum of policies by strengthening the political links with other countries24. To reach 
that policy it is important to design a negotiation process that can change the incentives 
established on the actual policy stance permitting the change to the new policy objective. 
6. The Negotiation Process 
From the Colombian government perspective the best outcome is to terminate the rent 
transfers from drug business to illegal violent groups (i.e. Drug cartels, Guerrillas or 
whatever comes in the future).  
To reach that objective Colombia has different possible ways. As it was shown, drug 
prohibition and extermination is the way that has been experimented, and it has been 
implemented together with some efforts to increase the life standard and therefore make 
more expensive the illegality attached to the drug business. As argued above this policy is 
suboptimal and might not be on the best interests of the Colombian society. 
On the other hand, the existence of a possibility to start a legalization process (pursuing 
legalization as the optimal policy) creates an alternative path to reduce the magnitude of 
                                        
24 This consequence does not come directly from the model presented above but it is possible to 
argument that under a three country game with another player located near to the economically 
optimal policy it will be possible for Colombia to start building links with the new player (i.e. 
Netherlands) and finally move towards the optimal policy. The proof of that fact can be obtained 
from the original paper by Akerlof 1997 or by a replication of his proof made on the  
Appendix 4: The Economic Decision: Three Parties of this paper. 
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the internal conflict. Under this option the government should try to either change the 
actual stance of other parties interested to terminate the problems caused by the illegal 
drug business rents (or drugs production) or to look out for new allies on a legalization 
policy. Those alternatives will reinforce the negotiation power of the country increasing 
the possibility of success on the task. 
To understand the Colombian government situation as well as the other parties’ interests 
on drug business  
Table 1 is presented. To read the table correctly keep in mind that drug 
business owners are some of the most important illegal violent actors on the 
internal conflict in the present. A brief explanation of each party’s interest is 
offered below. There are maximum two parameters on each cell of the table, the 
first one is the magnitude of interest and the second is the direction of the 
interest. 
Table 1: Interests on Drug Business: Colombia, Owners and U.S. 
Interests
 
Players 
Drugs 
Production 
Drugs rents to 
Colombian Conflict Colombian Conflict 
Colombian 
Government 
Low 
(Against) 
High 
(Against) 
High 
(On objectives*) 
Drug Business 
Owners None** 
High 
(For) 
High 
(On objectives*) 
U.S. 
Government 
High 
(Against) 
High 
(Against) 
Low 
(keep safe its interests) 
* Each party has different interests on the Colombian conflict, but both are interested on the 
outcome, especially on reaching their particular objectives as persons and groups. 
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** Drug business owners do not care about the drugs by it self; their interests are on the monetary 
rents they can earn from that business. 
6.1. The parties interests 
For the U.S. government the whole chain of the drug business has been manifested to be 
a problem. Politicians argue that it creates a social cost and illegal rent extraction25. 
The argument presented by the politicians and policy makers is that drug production 
represents a cost for the U.S. society because their high drugs consumption. 
As motioned before for Colombia the most important problems are the drug rents and the 
internal conflict, more than drug production, since drug consumption is not as expensive 
to the country as the other problems. Nevertheless, drug production could imply a large 
exposure of the population to drug consumption which could cause productivity 
reductions and other costs (i.e. as the problems observed on the U.S. population).  
From the drug business owner’s perspective, drug production is not an objective per se. 
Their objectives are to obtain rents to keep fighting the government or to benefit 
themselves or both depending on groups and persons26. 
After exposing the incentives of each party with interests on the drug business in 
Colombia, it should be interesting to analyze the policy that had been implemented in the 
                                        
25 However Becker et al. 2004 has shown that legalization is better for the whole U.S. society and 
his paper also has shown that the story behind the position of U.S. politicians and policy makers 
is that they do not have personal incentives to legalize the drug business. Moreover, this paper 
has shown that their attitude it is committed to be stuck on that policy. 
26 Generalizations such as drug traffickers, terrorists, bandits, guerrilla or any classifications are 
avoided here; that is because all adjectives are at some level true depending on individuals and 
groups. 
 37
U.S. on this issue. It is also important to understand the conflict of interests between 
Colombia and the U.S. on drug policy and what political alternatives are open to 
Colombian policy makers to pursue the best interest of the country. 
6.2. Conflict of interests and strategies 
The war on drugs as actually conceived, and its subscribed cooperation programs 
between U.S. and drug producing countries like Colombia have increased the political 
barriers to move out of the drug illegality as a suboptimal policy. This situation results on 
the protection of U.S. politicians and policy makers’ interests. 
Colombian politicians have a commitment with the U.S. policies created by the huge 
support given by the U.S. politicians and policy makers to fight on the internal conflict. 
This is especially true on the issues where Colombian interests and U.S. politicians and 
policy makers’ interests are aligned. Nevertheless, it is important to notice that the U.S. 
aid for the conflict has not been committed to a comprehensive solution for the 
Colombian problems27. 
By this exposition it is clear that Colombia and the U.S. decision makers’ interests are not 
aligned on the comprehensiveness and the focus of the problem. Each side has different 
interests and each one should try to reach the best policy to address its own problems. 
A strong linkage of the Colombian internal drug policy agenda with the U.S. policy will 
not help Colombia to solve its conflict. Moreover, an active participation on cooperation 
                                        
27 For more on that issue see the composition of the US aid to Colombia on the Table 3. It is 
clear that just the 20% has been transferred to social programs. Those policies do not show a 
commitment to change the social problems faced in Colombia that are the motor of the internal 
conflict. 
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programs that support the repressive war on drugs will maintain Colombia attached to the 
U.S. interests leading the national policies to be stuck on a suboptimal choice.  
As proposed on the previous chapter of this thesis, Colombia should search to strengthen 
its links to countries with a policy stance that could match better the optimal policy of 
drug legalization. With such a change on the political links Colombia may be able to 
change its own incentives and move towards drugs legalization.  
Another possibility explored here for Colombia is to promote a change on the policy 
stance of countries that have similar interests to the ones held by Colombia. As presented 
on the following table some Latin-American countries may share those interests. 
Table 2: Interests on Drug Business: Colombia, Owners and Other Parties 
Interests 
 
Players 
Drugs 
Production 
Drugs rents to 
Colombian 
Conflict 
Colombian Conflict 
Colombian 
Government 
Low 
(Against) 
High 
(Against) 
High 
(On objectives) 
Drug Business 
Owners None 
High 
(For) 
High 
(On objectives) 
Latin-American 
Governments 
Low 
(Against) 
High 
(Against) 
High 
(Stop spillovers) 
Governments close 
to legalization 
Low 
(Against) None Low 
U.S. 
Government 
High 
(Against) 
High 
(Against) 
Low 
(keep safe its interests) 
 
6.3. Potential Colombian allies on a legalization policy 
The countries added to the table are the ones closer to legalization such as the 
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Netherlands. The Netherlands have one of the most liberal drug policy stances in the 
world. Their policy tries to reach the optimal drug policy by reducing drug consumption 
by preventing, rather than repressing, the users.  
Nonetheless, Colombia has very little links to the Netherlands and the interests on the 
Colombian conflict are not necessary aligned between the countries. The drug production 
is as usual not approved by the Netherlands. The Colombian internal conflict by itself 
does not seem to represent a major concern for the Netherlands’ government. Colombia is 
geographically and politically far and does not affect much the Netherlands interests28. 
On the other hand, the Latin-American (L.A.) countries were also included in the Table 2. 
It is important to mention that the closest the L.A. countries are to Colombia, the more 
affected them are by the Colombian conflict. This means that if there are more rents on 
the drug business more weapons traffic and drug traffic is going thru their countries. 
When the conflict is rough they have been affected by invasions to their lands and by 
external displacement. Furthermore, Peru and Bolivia also produce large amounts of 
drugs, and countries such as Mexico and Brazil serve as corridors for the drug traffic and 
are affected by internal cartels. Finally, Colombia has more links to Latin-America than it 
has to any country outside the region. 
As a conclusion it could be argued that the best solution to reduce the drug impact by 
implementing a legalization process in Colombia should come from a strengthening of 
the links that tie the Latin-American countries. Moving together towards drug 
                                        
28 It is still important to remember that a strengthening of the links that Colombia has with 
Netherlands could lead to a better perspective of the drug market legalization. 
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legalization could reduce the impact of the drug business rents on each country’s internal 
problems. 
7. Conclusions 
From the Colombian history review it is possible to determine that drugs in Colombia are 
sources of rents and violence but are not necessarily linked to a particular guerrilla. Proof 
of that is the experience from the 80’s when drugs were mainly linked to a different kind 
of illegal and violent groups such as the drug cartels29. This is a symptom that has shown 
how if drugs business keeps guaranteeing its large profits its illegal character will remain 
as a source of violence for the country, no matter who is the violent actor in control of the 
business. 
Moreover, the internal conflict seen as the confrontation between illegal armed groups 
and the state will keep its highly violent nature if the drug is illegal. The guerrillas will 
keep getting resources out of the drug business to fight against the state and the 
Colombian government will keep getting resources from the U.S government 
perpetuating30 the Colombian internal conflict cycle described on the Figure 1. 
From this perspective the legalization process appears as an alternative exit to the violent 
and traditional way of facing the problem. Certainly, to guarantee the success of the 
policy Colombia should turn its external policy to the creation of new links that support a 
legalization process and to generate alternatives to the dependence on the U.S. 
                                        
29 Drug business is still linked to drug traffic bands different to guerrillas 
30 At least the conflict would last for an unknown period of time as mentioned by Echeverry 2004. 
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This process has been shown would be possible if made with countries that have policies 
close to legalization or by aligning interests with countries that share similar interests of 
Colombia. 
Nevertheless, as long as Colombia stays strongly linked to the United States (i.e. aid 
programs or other means that make the country highly dependent on the U.S.) the internal 
drug policy will remain linked to the prohibitive and confrontational approach set by the 
U.S. internal policy; at least until the U.S. policy changes its drug policy stance legalizing 
the drugs market. 
Finally it should be reminded that it is not granted that Colombian conflict would be 
solved if the illegal drugs business rents are either legalized or extirpated from Colombia. 
Colombia has experienced internal conflicts for more than forty years now and rents are 
only one more source financing the conflict. However, the causes of the problem are still 
making people work on illegal business and wars. The intensity of the conflict may be 
decreased by reducing the illegal drugs business rents; but all the causes of the conflict 
should be well identified and kept as a policy target to reach a comprehensive and lasting 
solution for the Colombian internal conflict. 
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9. Appendixes 
9.1.  Appendix 1: Literature Review 
Through the following literature review will be offered a concise recount of conclusions 
found on studies about the Colombian conflict. Even though, the main focus will be 
offered on the apart devote to the drug policies evaluation because it is the main interest 
of this work. 
The presentation starts with a background of the conflict moving towards a second part 
where is referred a recent picture of the conflict by summarizing the case studies on 
players incentives. A third part accounts for the literature on consequences of the conflict 
to terminate summarizing studies on the conflict resolution and mentioning comparative 
studies. 
Before starting it should be noticed that the most comprehensive analysis of the 
Colombian conflict is the book “A cul-de-sac with ways out”, by U.N.D.P. (2003). The 
mentioned study is composed of more than a theoretical or empirical analysis; it is a 
project to promote the conflict resolution in Colombia. Nevertheless, it analyzes and 
presents most of the areas involved in the Colombian conflict.  
9.1.1. Conflict Background 
On this area a panoramic presentation is offered by U.N.D.P. (2003); other works offer 
detailed explanations depending on interests. Bushnell (1993); presents an overview of 
the Colombian history. It covers from the very beginning of the Colombian history until 
the early 90’s. Detailed presentations are offered on different aspects on: Sánchez, Díaz 
and Formisano (2003) made a review of the conflict history on their first chapter, 
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García Durán (1992) present a recount on several peace processes held in Colombia, 
Rubio (2003) offers a detailed historic explanation of the kidnappings practice in 
Colombia. Some facts are offered also on most of the studies but not all show a historical 
review (see References on chapter 8).  
9.1.2. Behavior and incentives of the actual participants 
Ofstein (2002) analyzes the private rent extraction in the conflict based on the oil 
pipelines attacks he founds a rent seekers behavior (i.e. by means of extortion) on some 
groups in conflict. 
The U.N.D.P. (2003) project shows the different perspectives of the players in the 
conflict and present list of explicit objectives but tries also to analyze the implicit causes 
of the actions. They have been working on the project by collecting internal examples of 
conflict handling in particular regions of Colombia. 
Bottía (2003) found guerrilla to be a rent seeker focused on extraction of private rents or 
as an illegal business operator. She also found a contagious behavior that shows the 
guerrilla is more likely to expand its activities to territories near their control areas. 
Sánchez, Díaz and Formisano (2003) show how the guerrillas create a violent 
environment on the Colombian territory. They found a statistic link between the presence 
of illegal armed groups and the leading violence trends in Colombia. Moreover, they 
found that violence creates room to more violent activities spreading out the violent 
behavior in a region and making it time persistent. 
Duncan (2004) presents a quantitative analysis of the Colombian conflict seen as a 
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dispute for the control of the state on the local level.  
Díaz and Sánchez (2004) found a rent creation by the illegal armed groups. They found 
those groups to be linked to an extensive drug production in Colombia. 
9.1.3. Effects of the conflict: 
Although, the Colombian conflict influence different spheres of the society, the way of 
measuring its impact has being mainly recount by its economic or social effects. Both are 
referred here: 
Economic: Steiner and Corchuelo (2000) recount the costs of the drug traffic to the 
Colombian society. Pshisvha and Suárez (2004) evaluate the effects of the kidnappings 
on the firm investments. 
Social: U.N.D.P. (2003) evaluates regional and national consequences of the war to 
society. Pécaut (2001) contextualizes and characterizes the main historic trends and 
actual actors focusing his study on the effects of the war on the society. 
9.1.4. Conflict resolution 
Maybe the most notorious work on the field is the one made by U.N.D.P. (2003). The 
work is comprehensive on the national and international policies that must be taken into 
account. It states guidelines to address the national conflict main problems without losing 
of sense of reality and the conciseness of the international community roles. 
9.1.4.1. Drug Policies evaluation 
Moreno-Sanchez et al., (2003) found empirical evidence that show how crop substitution 
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might be better than coca eradication. Tabares and Rosales (2005) show broadly the same 
findings as Moreno-Sanchez et al., 2003. Naranjo (2004) evaluates the effects of 
interdiction and involuntary crop eradication concluding that interdiction is more 
effective than involuntary crop eradication. Díaz and Sánchez (2004) found that crop 
eradication via aerial spraying has not been an efficient tool in the fight against coca 
production in the country.  
Echeverry (2004) found that war on drugs makes sense only in the long run because it 
depends on the price elasticity demand on the U.S.  
On the international policies the most relevant paper on drug policies for this work is 
Becker et al. (2004). That study offers a literature review showing the state of the art on 
theoretical drug policy. It also develop and evaluates a model of drug policy effects 
concluding that that fighting a war on drugs by legalizing drug use and taxing 
consumption may be more effective than continuing to prohibit the legal use of drugs. 
9.1.4.2. Comparative studies 
Richani (2002) present on his last chapter presents a comparative analysis of the 
Colombian conflict to internal problems that happened on Italy, Lebanon and Angola. He 
argues that other countries have also passed thru struggles similar to the Colombian one. 
Those situations may offer keys to resolve the Colombian internal conflict. 
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9.2. Appendix 2: Plan Colombia 
Table 3: U.S. Aid to Colombia Since 2000: Summary Tables 
Military and Police Assistance Programs 
(millions of dollars; numbers underlined and italicized are estimates taken by averaging previous two years) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
2005, 
estimate 
2006, 
requested 
International Narcotics Control (INC, also known as "Andean 
Counterdrug Initiative) 
State Department-managed counter-drug arms transfers, training, 
and services 688.1 46.4 254.2 431 324.6 321.8 331.9 
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) 
Grants for defense articles, training and services 0 4.5 0 17.1 98.5 99.2 90 
International Military Education and Training (IMET) 
Training, usually not counter-drug 0.9 1 1.2 1.2 1.7 1.7 1.7 
Emergency Drawdowns 
Presidential authority to grant counter-drug equipment from U.S. 
arsenal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
"Section 1004" 
Authority to use the defense budget for some types of counter-drug 
aid 68.7 190.2 119.1 165 122 200 161 
"Section 1033" 
Authority to use the defense budget to provide riverine counter-
drug aid to Colombia 7.2 Included with above 
Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) 0 ? 25 3.3 0 3.9 2 
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Grants for anti-terrorism defense articles, training and services 
Excess Defense Articles (EDA) 
Authority to transfer "excess" equipment 0.4 0.5 2.4 3.4 2.9 2.9 2.9 
Discretionary Funds from the Office of National Drug Control 
Policy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Subtotal 765 242.6 401.9 621 549.7 629.5 589.5 
Percentage of total 78% 98% 77% 81% 79% 81% 80% 
 
Economic and Social Assistance Programs 
(millions of dollars) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
2005, 
estimate  
2006, 
requested  
Economic Support Funds (ESF) 
Transfers to the recipient government 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Development Assistance (DA) 
Funds for development projects 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
International Narcotics Control (INC, also known as 
"Andean Counterdrug Initiative) 
State Department managed funding for counter-drug 
economic and social aid 208 5.7 120.3 149.2 149.3 152.1 152.2 
Subtotal 212 5.7 120.3 149.2 149.3 152.1 152.2 
Percentage of total 22% 2% 23% 19% 21% 19% 20% 
        
Grand Total 977.3 248.3 522.2 770.2 699 781.6 741.7 
 51
Sources: http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/aidtable.htm 
International Narcotics Control: 
1997: United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Congressional Presentation (Washington: Department of State: 
March 1998): 32. 
1998: United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Congressional Presentation (Washington: Department of State: 
March 1999): 27. 
1999: United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2001 Budget Congressional Presentation (Washington: Department of State: 
March 2000): 34 <http://www.state.gov/www/global/narcotics_law/fy2001_budget/latin_america.html>. 
2000: United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2002 Budget Congressional Justification (Washington: Department of State: April 
2001): 30 <http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/rpt/cbj/fy2002/index.cfm?docid=3701>. 
United States Congress, Conference Report 106-701 on H.R. 3908, June 29, 2000 <http://ciponline.org/colombia/confrept.pdf>.  
2001: United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Congressional Justification (Washington: Department of State: April 
2002) <http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/rpt/cbj/fy2003/>. 
2002: United States, Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Congressional Justification (Washington: Department of State: June 
2003) <http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/rpt/cbj/fy2004/>. 
2003-2005: United States, Department of State, FY 2005 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington, DC: Department of State, February 2003) 
<http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/cbj/2005/>. 
Foreign Military Financing: 
1997: United States, General Accounting Office, "Drug Control: U.S. Counternarcotics Efforts in Colombia Face Continuing Challenges," GAO/NSIAD-98-60 (Washington: GAO, February 12, 1998) 
<http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp.cgi?IPaddress=waisback.access.gpo.gov&filename=ns98060.txt&directory=/diskb/wais/data/gao>. 
1999: United States, Department of Defense, Department of State, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 1999 and 2000: A Report to Congress 
(Washington: March 2000) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/fmtrain/toc.html>. 
2000: United States, Department of State, Department of Defense, Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest In Fiscal years 2000 and 2001, Volume I (Washington: March 
2001) <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/2001/fmtrpt/>. 
2002: United States, Department of State, FY 2004 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington, DC: Department of State, February 2003) 
<http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/cbj/2004/>. 
2003 supplemental: Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade, General Accounting Office, United States Congress, Financial and Management Challenges Continue to 
Complicate Efforts to Reduce Illicit Drug Activities in Colombia, GAO-03-820T (Washington: GAO, June 3, 2003) <http://www.gao.gov/docdblite/getrpt.php?rptno=GAO-03-820T>. 
2003-2005: United States, Department of State, FY 2005 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington, DC: Department of State, February 2003) 
<http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/cbj/2005/>.  
International Military Education and Training: 
1997: United States, Department of State, Office of Resources, Plans and Policy, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 1999 (Washington: March 1998): 1013. 
1998: United States, Department of State, Office of Resources, Plans and Policy, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2000 (Washington: March 1999): 1106-9. 
1999: United States, Department of State, Office of Resources, Plans and Policy, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2001 (Washington: March 2000). 
<http://www.state.gov/www/budget/fy2001/fn150/forops_full/150fy01_fo_military-asst.html>. 
2000: United States, Department of State, Office of Resources, Plans and Policy, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2002 (Washington: April 2001) 
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/3961.pdf>. 
2001: United States, Department of State, FY 2003 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington, DC: Department of State, April 15, 2002) 
<http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/cbj/2003/>. 
2002: United States, Department of State, FY 2004 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington, DC: Department of State, February 2003) 
<http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/cbj/2004/>. 
2003-2005: United States, Department of State, FY 2005 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington, DC: Department of State, February 2003) 
<http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/cbj/2005/>.  
Emergency Drawdowns: 
1997: United States, Department of State, "Summary Sheet," fax document, September 16, 1997. 
1998: United States, Department of State, "Memorandum of Justification for use of Section 506(a)(2) special authority to draw down articles, services, and military education and training," September 
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15, 1998. 
1999: United States, White House, "Draft Working Document: FY99 506(a)(2) Drawdown List Requested Items," Memorandum, September 30, 1999. 
"Section 1004": 
1997: H. Allen Holmes, coordinator for drug enforcement policy and support, United States Department of Defense, letter in response to congressional inquiry, Jan. 23, 1998. 
1998: Ana Maria Salazar, deputy assistant secretary of defense for drug enforcement policy and support, United States Department of Defense, letter in response to congressional inquiry, Mar. 19, 1999. 
1999: United States, Department of Defense, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, correspondence with authors, September 21, 2000. 
2000: United States, Department of Defense, "Report on Department of Defense Expenditures To Support Foreign Counterdrug Activities", Washington, December 29, 2000. 
United States Congress, Conference Report 106-701 on H.R. 3908, June 29, 2000 <http://ciponline.org/colombia/confrept.pdf>.  
2001-2005: Congressional Research Service, "Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) and Related Funding Programs: FY2005 Assistance," Washington, December 9, 2004 
<http://ciponline.org/colombia/041209crs.pdf>. 
"Section 1033": 
1998-2002: same as "Section 1004" above. 
Anti-Terrorism Assistance: 
United States, White House, Office of Management and Budget, "Technical Language" for supplemental appropriations request (Washington: March 21, 2002): 80 
<http://ciponline.org/colombia/02supp_technicallanguage.pdf>. 
2003-2005: United States, Department of State, FY 2005 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington, DC: Department of State, February 2003) 
<http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/cbj/2005/>.  
Excess Defense Articles: 
United States, Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Excess Defense Articles online database <http://www.dsca.osd.mil/home/excess_defense_articles_bbs.htm>. 
2003: United States, Department of State, FY 2005 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (Washington, DC: Department of State, February 2003) 
<http://www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/cbj/2005/>.  
ONDCP Discretionary Funds: 
United States, Executive Office of the President, Office of National Drug Control Policy, memo in response to congressional inquiry, February 1998. 
Economic and Social Assistance: 
1997-2003: Same as "International Narcotics Control" above.
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9.3. Appendix 3: Drug Price, Users and Expenditure 
Table 4: Price of One Pure Gram of Powder Cocaine 
 <2 grams 2 to 10 grams 
10 to 50 
grams 
> 50 
grams 
Year Average Average Average Average 
1981 544.59 345.64 280.55 201.18 
1982 590.86 337.46 267.12 186.54 
1983 471.87 311.02 215.06 158.2 
1984 400.69 252.74 170.08 136.53 
1985 389.6 239.24 170.56 135.34 
1986 296.94 186.06 130.5 100.19 
1987 250.55 145.78 98.63 74.56 
1988 223.55 126.83 73.79 56.95 
1989 189.92 109.54 67.02 52.98 
1990 234.94 133.17 84.74 71.6 
1991 198.34 99.18 67.19 55.79 
1992 153.96 97.27 62.19 52.28 
1993 156.18 95.57 63.58 49.68 
1994 147.43 86.42 55.45 43.55 
1995 181.58 87.64 57.68 48.68 
1996 150.13 84.13 50.67 42.59 
1997 145.72 80.21 52.07 45.75 
1998 132.09 78.71 47.02 38.59 
1999 135.51 82.39 50.16 43.52 
2000 161.28 99.4 55.26 48.02 
2001 168.29 81.38 53.98 44.87 
2002 124.54 74.36 47.27 41.59 
2003* 106.54 70.52 44.17 37.96 
* 2003 Prices are based on information from only the first two quarters of the year, and thus are likely to be updated in future reports. 
All prices are adjusted for inflation and reported in 2002 dollars. Estimates to the penny are provided to facilitate 
replication/confirmation and not intended to be meaningful interpreted given how brad the uncertainty bands are. 
Source: System to Retrieve Information on Drug Evidende (STRIDE) 
Prepared by: RAND Corporation 2/04 
Quoted in: The price and purity of illicit drugs: 1981 through the second quarter of 2003. Executive Office of the President. Office on 
National Drug Policy. Washington, D.C., 2004.  
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Table 5: Total U.S. Expenditures on Illicit Drugs, 1988-2000 ($Billions) 
Year Cocaine Total** Cocaine/Total 
1988 107.0 154 69.5% 
1989 88.4 132 67.0% 
1990 69.9 115 60.8% 
1991 57.1 97 58.9% 
1992 49.9 88 56.7% 
1993 45.0 77 58.4% 
1994 42.8 78 54.9% 
1995 40.0 75 53.3% 
1996 39.2 74 53.0% 
1997 34.7 68 51.0% 
1998 34.9 67 52.1% 
1999 35.6 65 54.8% 
2000* 35.3 64 55.2% 
Note: Amounts are in constant 2000 dollars 
* Estimates for 2000 are projections 
** Total includes: Cocaine, Heroine, Marijuana, Meth-amphetamine and other drugs  
Source: Office of national Drug Control Policy, What America's users Spend on Illegal Drugs, 1988-2000 (December 2001). 
Quoted in: National Drug Control Strategy. Data supplement. The White House, 2004. 
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Table 6: Estimated Number of users of Cocaine and Other Illegal Drugs  
(Thousands) 
Ages of 12 and older 
Year 
Current use 
of any 
illegal drug
Current 
cocaine use
Occasional 
cocaine use
1979 25,400 4,700 - 
1982 - 4,500 - 
1985 23,300 5,700 7,100 
1988 15,000 3,100 5,100 
1990 13,500 1,700 3,700 
1991 13,400 2,000 3,800 
1992 12,000 1,400 3,000 
1993 12,300 1,400 2,700 
1994 12,600 1,400 2,400 
1995 12,800 1,500 2,500 
1996 13,000 1,700 2,600 
1997 13,900 1,500 2,600 
1998 13,600 1,800 2,400 
1999 13,829 1,552 1,926 
2000 14,027 1,213 1,732 
2001 15,910 1,676 1,995 
2002 19,522 2,020 3,073 
Note: "Any illicit drug use" includes use of marijuana, cocaine, hallucinogens, inhalants (except 1982), heroine, or non-medical use of 
sedatives, tranquilizers, stimulants, or analgesics. The exclusion of inhalants in 1982 is believed to have resulted in underestimates of 
any illicit use for that year, especially for adolescents. 
- Data not available 
1 In 1999, the survey methodology changed from a paper-and-pencil interview (PAPI) to a computer-assisted (CAI). Estimates based 
on the new CAI methodology are not directly comparable to previous years. In 2002, the survey was renamed to the National survey 
on Drug use and Health and methodological changes were implemented that significantly affected reported prevalence rates. 
Therefore, estimates for 2002 are not directly comparable to previous years.  
2 Data for past-month (current) use. 
3 used on 1 to 11 days in the past 12 months. 
Sources: National Institute on Drug Abuse (1979-1991), and Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (1992-
2001), National Household Survey on Drug Abuse; Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (2002), National 
Survey on Drug use and Health. 
Quoted in: National Drug Control Strategy. Data supplement. The White House, 2004. 
 
 56
Table 7: Estimated Direct1 of Drug Abuse Costs to Society, 1992-2002  
($2002 Millions) 
Year 
Health 
Care 
Costs 
Other 
Costs 
Total 
Direct 
Costs 
1992 13,719 24,909 38,629 
1993 14,736 24,662 39,398 
1994 14,761 25,892 40,653 
1995 14,087 28,091 42,178 
1996 13,249 28,325 41,574 
1997 13,337 29,905 43,242 
1998 13,569 31,334 44,903 
1999 13,873 33,572 47,445 
2000 13,974 35,280 49,254 
2001 14,700 35,118 49,818 
2002 15,675 36,363 52,038 
1 Direct costs include health care costs attibutable to drug abuse and other costs which include the costs of goods and services lost to 
crime and social walfare costs. 
Source: Office of National Drug Control Policy . The economic costs of Drug Abuse in the United States, 1992-2002 (2004). 
Quoted in: National drug control stratgy. Data supplement. The White House 2004. 
Table 8: Estimated Indirect1 of Drug Abuse Costs to Society, 1992-2002 (2002$, 
Millions) 
Year Premature Death 
Drug 
Abuse 
related 
Illness 
Institutionalizatio
n/hospitalization 
Productivit
y loss of 
victims of 
crime 
Incarceration Crime careers Total 
1992 28,961 18,214 1,894 2,640 22,961 24,617 99,287 
1993 27,877 17,138 1,870 3,098 24,110 24,595 98,688 
1994 28,034 19,234 2,043 3,100 25,607 23,796 101,814
1995 28,406 20,938 2,210 2,806 27,130 23,812 105,302
1996 23,745 23,241 1,758 2,674 28,473 27,241 107,132
1997 19,901 22,323 1,863 2,570 30,511 29,824 106,992
1998 19,323 25,542 1,971 2,279 33,257 27,180 109,552
1999 22,535 26,995 1,873 2,111 35,399 26,952 115,865
2000 23,045 28,654 1,782 1,930 36,244 26,836 118,491
2001 23,686 30,681 1,870 1,835 36,869 26,957 121,898
2002 24,646 33,452 1,996 1,797 39,095 27,576 128,562
1 Indirect costs are productivity losses attributable to drug abuse 
Source: Office of National Drug Control Policy . The economic costs of Drug Abuse in the United States, 1992-2002 (2004). 
Quoted in: National drug control strategy. Data supplement. The White House, 2004. 
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9.4. Appendix 4: The Economic Decision: Three Parties31 
On this appendix will be proved as in Akerlof (1997) that when in the model introduced 
on the chapter 5 are reached some appropriate conditions then the introduction of a third 
player will not alter the suboptimal equilibrium even if the new player is located near the 
optimal equilibrium policy (drug legalization). 
The model variables and parameters interpretations given on the 5th chapter also apply in 
this case. 
Proof 
This game is defined as a three country; for one country (Colombia) the following 
segment will show how under certain condition optimizing politicians will locate their 
policy stance at the initial position of the nearest foreign country. This means that 
Colombia will locate its policy stance at the initial position of the U.S. (United States of 
America) (x0us) and could be proved by a similar argument that U.S. will choose to locate 
its policy stance at the initial position of country Col (x0Col). This happens even under the 
possibility of choosing a to locate the policy stance on a different position closer to the 
country “other” which is located near the economic optimum value (x0Othl). 
To maximize the indirect utility function of a Colombian politician represented by (1) 
preserving the absolute values, it is required to define the function by parts, changing the 
                                        
31 This proof is entirely taken (adapted) from Akerlof (1997) and does not show or pretends to 
show any major difference to the proof in his paper. The only purpose of the proof is to be clear 
on the scope of the analytical framework for the case of drugs that is analyzed here. 
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sign of the quantity (x1Col-x0us) from positive to negative as required. This means the 
general equation (1) can be defined for the interval x1Col <x0us as: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ −−⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ −+= USColColUS xxgxxfeU 01001 1  
 ( )[ ] ( )[ ] cbxaxxxgxxfe ColColOthColColOth ++−⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ −−⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ −+ 1210100 1         (5) 
Note that the quantities x1Col-x0us and x1Col-x0Oth are both negative in this range, since 
x1Col<x0us and x1Col<x0Oth.  
Differentiating (5) in the range x1Col <x0us the result is: 
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( )[ ] ( )[ ] [ ]baxxxgxxfe ColOthColColOth +−⎭⎬
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⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ −++ 12
0100
21        (6) 
In this range the first and third terms are constant; moreover it is assumed that x0Col <x0US 
and x0Col <x0US, what makes the first and third terms positive. On the second and third 
terms the parts ( )[ ]USCol xxg 01 −−  and ( )[ ]OthCol xxg 01 −− never changes its sign because 
on this range it is always true that x1Col <x0US and x1Col <x0Oth, which guarantees that the 
terms are not only positive, but never show a change on their direction (none of them 
exhibit peaks).  
The last term is positive 02 1 >+− bax Col  because it represents an intrinsic value for the 
politicians.  
In consequence, USCol xx 01 ≥  must be true because otherwise the optimum could not be 
reached since (6) is a concave function. 
For the interval x0US<x1Col< x1Oth, the function U1 is: 
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( )[ ] ( )[ ]⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ −+⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ −+= USColColUS xxgxxfeU 01001 1  
      ( )[ ] ( )[ ] cbxaxxxgxxfe ColColOthColColOth ++−⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ −−⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ −+ 1210100 1        (7) 
And in this range, 
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Reader may recall that derivatives are not well defined when the function changes its 
direction abruptly creating a discontinuity on the derivative function. This discontinuity 
can be observed on the function U1 when x1Col = x0us, where right hand derivative and left 
hand derivative have different magnitude (the function shows a peak). This fact alone 
does not guarantee immediately that this point is the optimum value of x1Col for country 
Col, but the optimality could be guaranteed if some conditions are fulfilled: The distance 
between x1Col and x0Oth should be sufficiently large but sufficiently small between x1Col 
and x0us and the intrinsic value of x should be small relative to the exchange value (e).  
Finally, in the range x1Col> x0Oth, the value of U1 is: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ −+⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ −+= USColColUS xxgxxfeU 01001 1  
      ( )[ ] ( )[ ] cbxaxxxgxxfe ColColOthColColOth ++−⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ −+⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ −+ 1210100 1        (9) 
and in this range,  
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There is no guarantee that 
11
1
x
U
∂
∂ is negative in this entire range since x1Col<x0Oth when 
it is negative for x0US< x1Col <x0Oth; nevertheless, if the marginal value of intrinsic utility, 
-2ax1Col+b, is sufficiently small, 
11
1
x
U
∂
∂  will be negative throughout this region. Thus it 
has been shown if the intrinsic value of x1Col is sufficiently small relative to the value of 
social exchange, and if Col and US are sufficiently distant from Oth and also from b/2a, 
the optimal value of x1Col will be x0US. 
A similar proof will show that under these same conditions the optimal value of x0US will 
be x1Col, and x1Oth will chosen close to b/2a. 
